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INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal article, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us,1 
Steven Brill recounts stories of Americans of modest to comfortable means, 
whose lives were turned upside-down, not just by tragic illness; but, by the 
cost of the cure. Sean and Stephanie Recchi, owners of a small start-up 
technology firm, discovered that his policy's $2,000/day cap did not come 
close to defraying six days in the hospital to develop a treatment plan 
($48,900) and the initial doses of chemotherapy ($35,000) for his non-
Hodgkin's lymphoma treatment.2 Feeling chest pains, Janice, a sixty-four 
(64)-year-old unemployed and uninsured woman, endured a four-mile 
ambulance trip, three hours of tests, and "some brief encounters with a 
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1 Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, 
Feb. 22, 2013, at 17–55. 
2 Id. at 18. 
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doctor," to learn she had indigestion.3 The $21,000 bill4 could have caused a 
recurrence of the indigestion or, even, the feared heart attack.5 Plagued by 
back problems, Steve, a thirty-something blue-collar worker, required a 
neurostimulator to be surgically implanted in his back. Sanguine that a day of 
the requisite outpatient care could not exceed the $45,000 remaining of his 
insurance benefits, he was sadly disabused of the illusion when he received a 
bill of $86,951.6 
Brill goes on to document multiple tales of patients' undergoing a variety 
of procedures, some routine, some not so routine.7 Despite the technical 
variety of their procedures, the suffering patients display striking similarities 
in their financial experience: First, the "unbundled"8 hospital charges for 
supplies were dramatically higher than what the patient would pay if he/she 
had purchased them at a local drugstore, even though the patient could hardly 
marshal the hospital's purchasing power. Second, patients are often double 
and triple-charged for items used in their care. Third, the price charged the 
patient for supplies and services was driven by the healthcare provider's 
"chargemaster," the hospital's "internal price list,"9 which appears to have no 
connection to the realities of cost accounting. Fourth, not every patient pays 
the chargemaster rates. Indeed, most do not.10 
                                                             
3 Id. at 22. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 32–34. 
7 Id. passim. 
8 Id. at 18. 
9 Id. at 22. 
10 Id. at 23. 
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This paper, however, will focus on the approximately 43 million persons 
who are or will be charged the chargemaster price.11 They are distinguished 
by their having no health insurance coverage or limited coverage. In either 
case, they have no public or private carrier to negotiate a lower "price" for 
their medical care. Only they are held to the Disneyland price structure of the 
chargemaster, a price structure that is increasingly invoked to explain our 
spiraling healthcare costs.12 Because they lack any institutional muscle to deal 
with healthcare providers, these individuals face horrific decisions of life, 
death, and poverty for themselves and their families. 
Focusing on this relatively large group of patients will underline both 
the larger market failures in healthcare and their potential solution. Because 
this population is uniquely and disastrously affected by those market failures, 
addressing their concerns first serves both the demands of education and the 
demands of justice. We conclude that multiple failures in the healthcare 
market make it irresponsible to rely on market mechanisms to allocate 
healthcare resources. Reliance on price to clear the market fails miserably 
because only this vulnerable population is even remotely price-sensitive. 
Instead, we propose to limit that population's healthcare costs to the price 
allowed by Medicare. In doing so, the grossest excesses found in the system 
are curbed, without reducing the incentives for that population to seek the 
healthcare insurance that is more broadly available under the Patient 
                                                             
11 In its most recent report, the U.S. Census Bureau states that 
approximately 48 million individuals reported being without healthcare 
coverage for all or part of 2012. The number is statistically unchanged from 
2011. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, U.S. DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE (Sept. 2013). On March 11, 2014, CNN reported that 4.2 million 
individuals had signed up for healthcare coverage through the ACA. CNN 
further reported that it was uncertain that enrollment would reach the CBO 
projected number of 6 million by March 31, 2013. The number of individuals 
still not covered by the ACA would approximate 42 to 44 million. 
12 E.g., Hamilton Moses III et al., The Anatomy of Health Care in the 
United States, 301 JAMA 1947, 1949 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1769890. 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA").13 The proposed remedy has the 
added feature of testing a promising method to control the country's still 
rising healthcare costs. By comparison to other institutional players (namely, 
insurance companies), Medicare and Medicaid have been remarkably 
successful at reducing most healthcare costs.14 Applying their systems and 
methods to the vulnerable population would provide a useful laboratory for 
testing how we can constrain healthcare costs. 
I. PATIENTS CAUGHT IN THE COST TRAP 
Blessed with an embarrassment of riches, Brill unpacks the charges 
found in bill after patient bill. Just one example will highlight the looking 
glass quality of the "market." Returning to Steve Recchi's eight (8)-page 
invoice, Brill details how each product and service enjoyed a 400 to 1500% 
markup from their retail prices. Paradigmatically, a generic acetaminophen 
tablet (325 mg), currently priced on Amazon at 2.59 cents,15 cost Recchi, 
$1.50.16 In truth, you can't buy a single tablet on line. You must have the 
buying power sufficient to purchase in bulk; namely, a bottle of 1,000 tablets, 
which costs $19.12, or less than 2 cents per tablet.17 Apparently, the hospital 
could not avail itself of the volume discounts that Recchi enjoys at Amazon. 
Recchi's experience is hardly unique.18 
                                                             
13 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 111-148 
124 Stat. 11 (2010) (codified as amended in sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 
U.S.C.). 
14 Brill, supra note 1, at 43, 46–47. 
15 A 100-pill bottle costs $2.59. Brill reports that he could purchase a 
100-pill bottle for $1.49 on Amazon.com. Brill, supra note 1, at 18. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 A billing advocate for another patient, Scott S., determined that Texas 
Southwestern Medical had triple-billed him for portions of his ICU treatment: 
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The hospital's chargemaster, its ultimate billing source, appears to bear 
little, if any, relation, to the hospital's actual cost structure; rather, it appears 
to be simply an assessment of what the market will bear, like a 
"hypersteroidal rack rate."19 Brill describes the document as an 
embarrassment to hospital officials, who "treat it as if it were an eccentric 
uncle living in the attic."20 Nevertheless, with one important exception, it 
drives price for most healthcare consumers. That one exception is the 
government healthcare programs. Because of their market power and 
extensive cost databases, Medicare21 and Medicaid,22 pay only a tiny fraction 
of the chargemaster rate. In fact, the government does not even use the 
chargemaster as a guide, relying instead on its own assessment of the 
provider's cost structure. Large insurers, having less leverage than the 
government, pay a significantly higher price, usually discounted from the 
chargemaster rates. Smaller insurers, with still less leverage, enjoy smaller 
discounts off the chargemaster list. Individual patients, not covered by 
insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid receive the "special" chargemaster price. 
Incredibly, only those least able to pay, those without insurance or a 
                                                                                                                              
First they charge more than $2,000 a day for the ICU, 
because it's an ICU and has all this special equipment 
and personnel. . . . Then they charge $1,000 for some kit 
used in the ICU to give someone a transfusion or 
oxygen. . . . And then they charge $50 or $100 for each 
tool or bandage or whatever that there is in the kit. That's 
triple billing. 
Brill, supra note 1, at 17. 
19 Tina Rosenberg, The Cure for the $1000 Toothbrush, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2013, at 4, available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/ 
08/13/the-cure-for-the-1000-toothbrush/. 
20 Brill, supra note 1, at 22. 
21 Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 4; Brill, supra note 1, at 43, 46–49. 
22 Brill, supra note 1, at 46–49. 
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government-sponsored program, are singled-out to pay the exorbitant 
chargemaster rates.23 
If cost structure does not explain the hospital's price list, what does? One 
might expect healthcare competitors to be the key driver. Again, however, 
analysis leads only to mystification. Recently, the federal government has 
released the amounts hospitals charge for various procedures.24 A joint 
replacement in Ada, Oklahoma, will cost $5300; in Monterey Park, 
California, $223,000. However lovely it is in Monterey Park, it is unlikely 
that the hospital's cost structure would be 42 times greater than it would be in 
Ada, Oklahoma. One might, nevertheless, be seduced by the notion that the 
two hospitals are simply in different markets. Being in the same geographic 
market does not, however, rationalize price. The same study reports that, in 
New York City, the charge for treating a blood clot on a lung can range from 
$29,869 to $51,580.25 Admittedly, the range is dramatically less than the 
national range for joint replacement. However, it is still much greater than 
one expects in a truly competitive market. The seeming irrationality is not 
even readily explained by hospital's willingness to charge what the "market" 
will bear. "At Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland—serving an affluent 
community at the gates of the National Institutes of Health—the average 
charge for simple pneumonia was $5,284. Compare that to $79,365 at 
Hahnemann University Hospital in Philadelphia." A quick look at some of the 
comparable data26 suggests that the much more affluent zip code of the 
Bethesda, Maryland, hospital is getting an incomprehensible deal: 
                                                             
23 Id. at 22. 
24 Connie Cass & Lauran Neergaard, High hospital bills go public, but 
will it help, SEATTLE TIMES, May 8, 2013, available at http://seattletimes 
.com/html/health/2020944456_apushospitalcostsdisparity.html. 
25 Id. 
26 CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/zips (last visited May 3, 
2014) (for the zip codes of both hospitals). 
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IRS Category from 2004 
(most recent available) 
Bethesda, MD 20814 Philadelphia, PA 19102 
Avg. Adjusted Gross Income 123,634 72,894 
Avg. Taxable Dividends     9,064   6,217 
Avg. Net Capital Gains   33,934 12,466 
Avg. Self-Employment Pension   22,529 14,680 
Most of our 2010 healthcare debate revolved around who would pay for 
what kinds of care. Only at the margins did we begin to address the problem 
of how much we should pay for the care we receive.27 Studies show that our 
national healthcare costs are dramatically higher than all other countries and 
our results are just as dramatically uneven.28 For significant populations 
within the country, access to healthcare is more limited than it is for 
populations in some developing countries.29 Evening out access to healthcare 
is directly related to the extraordinary costs of that care. If nothing is done 
about cost, the 48 million individuals who have become eligible for 
healthcare under the ACA promise to severely strain national resources.30 
However salutary it may be to assure (almost) universal access to healthcare, 
containing costs remains an unaddressed and potentially crippling reality. 
Remarkably, it has yet to be addressed. 
Analytically, controlling costs is pretty straightforward. "Cost" has only 
two components: price and quantity (Cost = price x quantity). In our current 
system, most of our feeble cost containment efforts have focused on 
                                                             
27 See Brill, supra note 1, at 20. 
28 See, e.g., id. at 18; Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, 
Costliest in the World, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o7/01/health/american-way-of-birth-costliest-
in-the-world.html. 
29 Tina Rosenberg, Revealing a Healthcare Secret: The Price, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2013, available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/31/a-new-health-care-approach-dont-hide-the-price/ (citing Brill, 
supra note 1). 
30 Rosenberg, supra note 19. 
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controlling the quantity of medical resources consumed. Typically, insured 
patients are limited to acquiring prescriptions or healthcare services for only 
limited periods of time: an annual check-up, enough prescription medicine to 
last 30 days. Routine exams and tests similarly must meet some periodic 
limitation. Indeed, one can even view the "copay" as a quantity constraint, a 
disincentive to use medical services. Obviously, for the uninsured, both price 
and quantity do matter. For reasons discussed below, and alluded to above, 
they cannot do much about price. Many try to self-limit quantity, with 
potentially devastating consequences when the malady, easily addressed in its 
early stages, becomes expensive (and possibly untreatable) in its late stages. 
Controlling quantity, however, has clearly not worked. While Brill 
reports of some incidents where patients appeared to "over-consume" medical 
resources,31 that particular problem appears marginal. Most people do not 
find their lives so empty and lonely that they look forward to having it filled 
up with medical attention. Just living precludes that "luxury." Similarly, few 
of us are tempted by an inordinate desire to over-consume ordinary 
prescription drugs for diabetes, high blood pressure, cholesterol and other 
common maladies. They just don't taste that good; nor, do they promise much 
recreational value, prescription narcotics excepted. 
II. PRICE IS THE PROBLEM AND A SYMPTOM OF A DEEPER PROBLEM 
Brill is hardly alone in concluding that prices for medical resources are 
out of control.32 Healthcare providers charge prices that would prod Alan 
                                                             
31 Brill, supra note 1, at 49. 
32 See e.g., That CT scan costs how much?, CONSUMER REPORTS (July 
2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/07/that-ct-scan-
costs-how-much/index.htm, passim; Matthew Yglesias, America's Overpaid 
Doctors, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2013), passim, http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
business/moneybox/2013/02/american_doctors_are_overpaid_medicare_is_ 
cheaper_than_private_insurance.html; Ezra Klein, High health-care costs: It's 
all in the pricing, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2012, passim, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/business/high-health-care-costs-its-all-in-the-pricing/  
2012/02/28/gIQAtbhimR_story.html; David Belk, The True Cost of 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 9 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) Ɣ DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.76 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Mastering the 
Chargemaster  
Winter 2014 
Greenspan to mutter anew about "irrational exuberance." The singularly high 
cost of healthcare in this country is not attributable to the quantity of 
healthcare products and services consumed. All evidence supports the 
proposition that the high cost of healthcare is driven by the price of 
healthcare. High prices and wild price variance33 reflect some profound 
failures in the healthcare market. That prices vary so much within the same 
market testifies to the absence of expected market restraints, as will be 
discussed below.34 The existence of (comparatively) low-price options only 
underscores the seeming irrationality. Yet, there remains a fundamental 
rationality to the exuberance. Providers charge those prices because they can. 
Some may just be more giddy (greedy?) than others. Moreover, providers can 
charge whatever they want, because every other player in the system (except 
one, the federal government) does not have to care about the price. While 
most patient-buyers cannot shop around, the uninsured patient is even more 
restricted to simply taking the random price demanded by the provider. As 
will also be discussed more directly below,35 the inability to control price is 
rooted in major (and irremediable) market failures. 
In an article written over fifty years ago, Kenneth Arrow36 pointed out 
how ill-suited are patient/consumers to be the leading spear for price control. 
They are (by definition) sick, unschooled in the subject matter (which is why 
they have turned to a professional), unschooled in the risks they confront (just 
by being human), uncertain whether any particular protocol will be 
successful, scared, and wholly ignorant of price. Rare is the patient who 
receives an array of possible remedies, each with an identified probability of 
success and an actual price. Indeed, it would be almost boorish to discuss cost 
                                                                                                                              
Healthcare: A view of Healthcare Costs from the Inside, passim, http://www 
.truecostofhealthcare.org (last visited July 2, 2014). 
33 Klein, supra note 32, at 4. 
34 See infra Section III. 
35 See infra Section III. 
36 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 948–49 (1963). 
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in such a vitally personal matter.37 As discussed below,38 even the loutish 
patient who might ask will find little reliable (and useful) data applicable to 
his situation. 
Patients have generally ceded price control responsibility to their 
insurance companies, who have only a limited concern to control price. 
Typically, patients worry (some) about their deductible, and (less) about their 
co-pay. They expect that their insurance company will pick up the rest of the 
tab. Ultimately, however, insurance companies have no dog (or only a very 
tiny dog) in the price fight. If, in any current year, insurance payouts 
compromise profit expectations, the resulting difference becomes the basis 
for raising premiums the following year. Any one year's loss can be made up 
the following year.39 With the implementation of the ACA, the incentive 
structure doesn't really change. If anything, it removes any remaining 
incentive for insurance companies to care. So long as their allowed 20% 
margin (for administrative costs and profit) is protected, any further savings, 
via negotiated price reductions, will be returned to the rate payer. If claims 
eat into the 20%, they simply provide the basis for a higher premium the 
following year. Underscoring how perverse the incentive structure remains, 
20% of a larger number (i.e., increased costs) will only generate a larger 
revenue stream and, presumably, even greater profit in the following year. 
One might look to the individual physician, who generally orders the 
care via prescription or referral, to serve as the bulwark against excessive 
prices. For a variety of reasons, some benign, some malignant, that hope is 
similarly misplaced. Even though physicians bill patients for services, the 
social norms preclude their acting simply as self-interested business owners. 
The norms themselves are unsurprising, given the fiduciary character of the 
relationship. The patient goes to a physician to get both a diagnosis and a 
treatment. Virtually ignorant of the elements of either prong of the 
consultation, the patient must rely on the physician's expertise and integrity. 
                                                             
37 Id. at 964–66. 
38 Infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
39 Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 2. 
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For that reason, physicians are typically forbidden (or discouraged) from 
advertising or engaging in overt price competition.40 Their medical advice 
must be devoid of self-interest.41 Treatment prescriptions are presumed 
driven by case requirements and ought not to be limited by financial 
considerations. These long-standing norms reinforce a level of physician-
patient trust that makes discussions of price almost unseemly and, not 
surprisingly, give birth to acts of individual medical charity for the indigent 
and the related price-discrimination among affluent patients.42 
Other factors also limit the physician's role in cutting costs. Not 
surprisingly, physicians want to have available as broad an array of remedies 
for their patients' ailments as is possible.43 Considering cost limits that array. 
Consistent with a disdain for and/or discomfort with money being interjected 
into considerations of care, physicians, not unlike their patients, are often 
wholly ignorant of the price of their various healthcare remedies.44 Indeed, 
they may be as ignorant of costs as are their patients. One physician, David 
Belk, MD, chronicling his own epiphany, captures the problem of physician 
ignorance in his opening statement on why medical costs are so high. 
Why didn't we know [why medical costs were so high]? 
To start with, unlike any other business in America, 
almost all of the financial transactions in healthcare are 
hidden from the providers as well as the patients. We 
order test, procedures and medications to manage our 
patients, but very few doctors, or other healthcare 
providers, have any idea how much any of those things 
cost. Patients only rarely pay directly for these services 
and payment for any service varies substantially from 
different payers. Hospitals have separate billing 
                                                             
40 Arrow, supra note 36, at 949. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 953. 
43 Belk, supra note 32, at 4. 
44 Id. 
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departments that are far removed from anyone ordering 
or performing tests or procedures. No one directly 
involved with patient care has any notion of the charge 
or reimbursement for their service. Even most private 
doctor's offices contract billing companies, who just send 
them a check each month from the total amount 
collected, leaving them no notion of the actual charge or 
reimbursement for an individual service they provided.45 
In summary, none of the principal sources of consumption—neither the 
patients, their families, nor their immediate healthcare providers (their own 
physicians)—are in a position even to know what the costs are of a 
procedure, let alone control those costs. The insurance company is in a 
slightly more advantaged position, having likely negotiated prices for specific 
procedures, as well as prescriptions and equipment. That, however, is not the 
same as knowing the cost of the procedure. Indeed, for most insurance 
companies, the price is simply a "discounted" chargemaster price.46 However, 
if, as is usually the case, the chargemaster is a multiple of 10–15 times the 
provider's actual cost,47 a "whopping" 50% discount is something less than a 
negotiating coup. The healthcare system is like a rigged game of poker,48 
where the patient, especially if not insured through either his employer or the 
government, is the ultimate patsy. 
Notwithstanding these obvious flaws in the system, there are still many 
who advocate that the real cure for healthcare is to allow the free competitive 
marketplace to work its magic.49 This would assure resolution of both our 
                                                             
45 Id. 
46 Brill, supra note 1, at 23 
47 See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 4. 
48 Brill, supra note 1, at 54 (calling it "a crapshoot"). 
49 See, e.g., Ron Paul, Ron Paul: We Need Free-Market Healthcare, 
NOT Obamacare, RONPAUL.COM (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.ronpaul.com/ 
2010-03-22/we-need-free-market-healthcare-not-obamacare/; Ron Paul, Ron 
Paul on Free Markets, Regulation, Auditing the Fed & Healthcare, 
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cost and access issues.50 Prices would drop and quantity is unlikely to rise, 
given the low marginal utility of overconsumption.51 If prices drop and 
quantity remains stable, costs must also drop. However, as opponents of the 
ACA pointed out, the second element of the healthcare issue, access, 
dramatically affects the first element, costs. Quantity cannot remain stable if 
somewhere between 35 and 45 million citizens52 are to be provided 
healthcare under the enactment. Even after accounting for the efficiencies 
resulting from early diagnoses and treatment of potentially serious and 
expensive illnesses, filling the system with that many "new" consumers has to 
increase quantity and, ultimately, cost. 
One suggested answer is simply to bar the door. It was captured 
succinctly in the 2012 Republican primary debates, when Rep. Ron Paul was 
asked whether society should pay for the emergency care of a young man in a 
coma who had chosen not to purchase insurance. To make the hypothetical 
work, one has to assume that the man now had no assets (money or 
insurance) to enable him to purchase the needed treatment. Paul was asked 
how he would address the dilemma of the uninsured comatose patient. The 
candidate stumbled53 a bit, as he said that people make decisions and need to 
expect to live (presumably, no pun intended) with the consequences of those 
decisions. Obviously, in the non-hypothetical world, few adults "choose" to 
go without healthcare coverage, except when they cannot afford it. To extend 
Paul's comments to the broader societal question of indigent healthcare, Paul 
would be referring to the Everyman's "decisions" that had left him without 
                                                                                                                              
RONPAUL.COM (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.ronpaul.com/2009-11-06/ron-
paul-on-free-markets-regulation-auditing-the-fed-and-healthcare/. 
50 Grace-Marie Turner, Toward Free-Market Healthcare, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/lecture/toward-free-market-health-care. 
51 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
53 Should society let the uninsured die?, YOUTUBE (Aug. 28, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8T9fk7NpgIU. 
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assets and not his "decision" to have a heart attack. When Wolf Blitzer 
pressed him, would Paul "let him die?" a number of his (presumably) 
supporters shouted "Yes," to general applause from the audience.54 
However problematic are the ethics underlying such an ethos, the law 
has already addressed the policy issue. If the man did not have the resources, 
he would, depending on his age, be covered under either Medicare or 
Medicaid. Moreover, as a matter of federal law, no one may be turned away 
from a hospital simply for lack of funds.55 Such a longstanding statutory 
expression of public policy, makes it unlikely that the Paul supporters could 
rally public support for their chilling view of public policy. As it stands now, 
the indigent and the elderly have affordable healthcare through the 
government, who successfully sets prices for healthcare services. The next 
large group of healthcare consumers is "protected," at least to some extent, by 
employer provided health insurance companies. A much smaller segment 
purchases its own insurance. Unlike the government "carriers," insurance 
companies are not as successful at controlling prices. While Medicare and 
Medicaid, armed with an incomparable database and genuine market power, 
can simply ignore the chargemaster, insurance companies exploit their more 
limited leverage to reduce the amount of chargemaster-based prices.56 The 
most vulnerable population is the one group that is neither protected by the 
government nor by an insurance company. Only that group's members are 
caught up in a completely rigged "free" market. 
III. THE MARKET IS THE PROBLEM; NOT THE SOLUTION 
Given the political attractiveness for those who would "set the market 
free," it serves to recall some basic conditions for the existence of a 
competitive free market. The list is short: 
                                                             
54 Id. 
55 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act § 9121, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986). 
56 Brill, supra note 1, at 43–44, 46–49. 
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A. There are numerous buyers and sellers, all of whom are "price-
takers"; 
B. There are no barriers to entry or exit; 
C. Every buyer and seller has full and perfect knowledge of the 
market, including the knowledge of what every other buyer and 
seller is doing, as well as knowledge of the price, quantity, and 
quality of the goods bought and sold in that market; 
D. The goods/services are fungible; 
E. There are no externalities; 
F. All buyers are utility-maximizers; and 
G. No external parties regulate price, quality, or quantity.57 
A. NUMEROUS BUYERS AND SELLERS AS PRICE-TAKERS 
Clearly, the healthcare market fails on most or all of these component 
parts. Depending on how one looks at the "market," one can argue that there 
are numerous buyers and sellers; but, it cannot be said that all of the players 
are price-takers. Certainly, Medicare and Medicaid patients are protected by a 
price-maker. Depending on the financial strength of their respective carriers 
in the relevant local and national markets, privately insured patients enjoy a 
modest protection from healthcare providers by dint of their carriers' ability to 
negotiate some price concessions. While the uninsured, non-government 
protected patient-buyer is a price-taker, the same cannot be said of the 
correlative provider-seller. Whether it is a pharmacy, a private physician, or a 
hospital/medical institution, the provider alone (if then) sets the price. 
Moreover, as medical care providers, especially hospitals merge and 
                                                             
57 These are pretty standard conditions to be found in just about any 
college economics text. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, 
ECONOMICS passim (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 19th ed. 2010). 
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incorporate more private physicians into their networks, their market power 
increases. As that process accelerates, the market power of their primary foil, 
insurance companies, diminishes.58 The effect of this consolidation is to 
reduce the number of providers, affording the remaining ones the leverage to 
more closely approximate their chargemaster wish list. 
B. BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXIT 
Depending on one's place in the market, there are multiple barriers to 
entry and exit. For the patient, death is the only "viable" exit strategy. While 
some health problems may be ignored for a while, few of them ever age well. 
Only those who suffer a quick and untimely death can actually exit the 
market. That, however, is a one-time only option. Nevertheless, even most in 
that select population entered the market upon entering life. By any 
definition, patients form a captive market. For providers, also, there are 
certainly barriers to entry. One of the most profound barriers is represented 
by the strict rationing of places in medical school, which constricts the 
number of physicians in the marketplace,59 leading to a consequent oligopoly. 
With increasing consolidation of healthcare facilities, via mergers and 
acquisitions, the healthcare industry (at the institutional level) further raises 
the barriers to competitive entry, while reinforcing its oligopolistic (and even 
monopolistic) systems.60 
C. PERFECT INFORMATION 
As virtually every writer has observed,61 buyers have almost no 
information about market conditions. For most patients, knowledge about 
                                                             
58 Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 2, 3; Brill, supra note 1, at 40, 55. 
59 Arrow, supra note 36, at 952. 
60 See Brill, supra note 1, at 40. 
61 E.g., id. at 40, 54; Belk, supra note 32, at 4; Arrow, supra note 36, at 
962 (noting that insurance removes even the incentive for the central 
players—physicians and patients—to price shop); Rosenthal, supra note 19, 
at 4. 
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price, quantity, and quality is virtually inaccessible. There is no price 
transparency whatsoever. Typically, patients are never advised of price until 
after the transaction has taken place.62 However, even if the patient were to be 
told in advance of the price of a procedure, it would not help much. More 
likely than not, the patient would be given the chargemaster rate, unadjusted 
for discounts negotiated by the patient's public or private carrier.63 Even if 
such price information were available, it is unlikely that similar information 
would be available from competing providers that would make the 
information relevant to a decision. Finally, even if such information were 
available from both the expected provider and competitors, the typical patient 
has no means to evaluate the information and is often too stressed to evaluate 
it.64 Alternatively, the patient is too ill, even unconscious, to engage in 
comparison shopping, whether of the on-line or on-foot variety. Finally, it 
may well be that the patient's physician probably only has privileges at one, 
or maybe two, institutions available for the procedure.65 
The problem of knowledge in and of the marketplace actually is even 
more acute. In the case of services, the physician may not have much 
knowledge about the comparative merits of the available institutional 
choices.66 Moreover, he/she may have familiarity with or be restricted to 
practicing in only one of the available choices, creating an implicit conflict of 
interest between physician and patient. Further, the physician may well be as 
clueless about the cost-benefit analysis as is his/her patient.67 Finally, most 
                                                             
62 Brill, supra note 1, passim. 
63 E.g., id. at 22. 
64 Arrow, supra note 36, at 949, 964–65. 
65 The rise of medical tourism, borne of high U.S. surgical costs, has 
created a cottage industry abroad. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, The 
Growing Popularity of Having Surgery Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/the-growing-popularity-
of-having-surgery-overseas/. 
66 See Belk, supra note 32, at 28. 
67 Id. at 28; Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 4. 
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institutional providers, as well as individual providers, cannot say what a 
procedure/remedy will cost, without first knowing the patient's specific 
insurance plan. Obviously, if there is no patient insurance, that complication 
is removed; but, at an enormously greater cost; that is, by ready reference to 
the chargemaster.68 In many cases, the attending physician may be just as 
unaware of price and quality when it comes to prescriptions or medical 
equipment.69 Moreover, even if the physician knows what the list price is for 
the goods, he/she would almost certainly not know what the carrier's 
particular discount is, or even if the patient is covered by insurance at all. 
Below, we discuss specifically how physicians compromise their judgment 
by holding a financial interest in the remedy prescribed—whether 
pharmaceuticals, devices, or equipment.70 
D. FUNGIBLE GOODS AND SERVICES 
With regard to the fungible quality of healthcare goods and services, the 
results are mixed. With regards to services, it would appear that the softer 
qualities of the physician-patient relationship argue for lack of fungibility. 
Nevertheless, the entire medical industry has relied for decades on an 
elaborate encoding system for payments related to each medical procedure, a 
system which argues for greater fungibility.71 Both government and private 
carriers have embraced the coding system.72 One would expect that there be 
greater fungibility among healthcare goods such as prescriptions and medical 
equipment. On the surface, that is actually true. In practice, the situation is 
more complicated. For a variety of reasons, doctors prescribe different 
medications, medical equipment, and therapies. The variance can be 
attributed in part to physician awareness of a patient's unique health 
                                                             
68 Brill, supra note 1, at 54 
69 Belk, supra note 32, at 4. 
70 Infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
71 Brill, supra note 1, at 48. 
72 Id. 
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requirements, to physician familiarity and comfort with certain protocols 
(with attendant efficiencies), or just availability in a particular region. 
More troubling, however, is the growing practice of physicians' 
receiving significant compensation from companies whose medical devices 
(e.g., joint replacements, heart "parts," such as defibrillators, valves, etc.) they 
adopt.73 The compensation can take the form of "stock options, royalty 
agreements, consulting agreements, research grants, and fellowships."74 
Whatever the form, it raises serious conflict-of-interest issues that certainly 
could direct patient "choices" and even lead to over-prescription.75 Rarely, 
however, would the patient even know the price of the prescribed equipment, 
how it compares to similar types of equipment, or the nature of his 
physician's financial interest in the "choice."76 In any event, the argument for 
fungibility is seriously compromised. 
E. NO EXTERNALITIES 
The requirement that there be no externalities in a perfectly competitive 
market (or even a "tolerably" competitive market) may be the element least 
often found in healthcare. An externality is any cost or benefit from a 
transaction that is borne or enjoyed by a party who is not a participant in the 
transaction.77 With the one possible exception that is the ultimate focus of this 
examination, virtually every provider-patient transaction involves third-
parties, and consequent externalities. Patients receive treatment and, only 
rarely, pay for it (or for most of it). The federal government, with state 
support, pays for the treatment of the elderly and indigent patient. Similarly, 
                                                             
73 Id. at 34. 
74 Brill, supra note 1, at 34. 
75 Id.; Robert Pear, Doctors Who Profit From Radiation Prescribe It 
More Often, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2013, passim, available at http://nytimes 
.com/us/doctors-who-profit-from-radiation-prescribe-it-more-often.html. 
76 Pear, supra note 75, passim. 
77 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 603 (4th ed. 2007). 
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insurers guarantee (some) payment; but, do not receive treatment. Both the 
government and the private insurer are affected by cost. The government is 
accountable ultimately to tax payers. The insurance company is accountable 
to shareholders. Because of data and leverage, the government can positively 
(from its perspective) affect the cost of the transactions.78 Insurance 
companies have less leverage; but, an obvious escape hatch. If they cannot 
match their costs stream with their premium stream, they can always raise 
premiums in the next year.79 Unlike the government, which is loath to raise 
taxes, insurance companies can always raise their rates, forcing employers 
and the insured to absorb the price increases. Employers continue to pay for 
insurance; but, do not receive the treatment. For them, healthcare expenses 
are a source of worry and concern, without much of a lever to control either 
element of cost price or quantity.80 
That leaves only the providers and the patient. While some providers are 
as uninformed as are their patients,81 others are just happy to provide as much 
care at as high a cost as possible. Their motivation is uncomplicated in the 
extreme. Patients also fall into two, albeit different groups. Virtually all 
patients are ignorant of pending costs. Most insured patients, however, simply 
do not care what the cost is. After paying their deductible (and, usually, small 
co-pays), they know only that someone else will pick up their remaining tab. 
What remains are those patients without either public or private 
insurance, or are insufficiently insured. Their experience of externalities is 
primarily negative. Unlike their insured counterparts, they care intensely 
about cost. Like their insured counterparts, however, they neither know the 
price of what they are buying nor have the emotional temperament to 
rationally weigh obscurely defined options in major life or death decisions or, 
                                                             
78 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 4. 
79 Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 2 and 4; e.g., Brill, supra note 1, at 4, 
37–38. 
80 Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 4. 
81 See Belk, supra note 32, at 4 and accompanying text. 
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less dramatically, major health decisions.82 Moreover, as pointed out above, 
even if they could know their costs for each option in advance of purchase, 
and even if they could rationally assess those options, they lack the 
bargaining power of either the insurance companies or the federal 
government.83 The ultimate perversity in the system is that providers look to 
this last pool of consumers to subsidize the profits they have relinquished to 
those with significantly more market power; namely, the government and 
insurance companies. In effect, this population subsidizes the rates of the 
variously insured populations. As a result of their lack of market power, they 
forgo much preventive care, and with it, early diagnosis. As observed 
above,84 undiagnosed health problems seldom improve with age. When those 
problems can no longer be ignored, they require very expensive attention and 
frequently a consequent bankruptcy.85 Unplanned and expensive healthcare 
issues represent the largest single cause of Chapter 7 filings.86 Bankruptcy is 
the final externality. For the patient it offers of the hope of a "fresh start:" 
albeit one, without their former assets, often accumulated over a lifetime. For 
the hospital, it represents a loss of a peculiar nature. It is a loss calculated at 
the bloated chargemaster rate and then written-down as bad debt for tax-
purposes. Given the nature of the chargemaster, the tax recovery is typically 
greater than the original cost (or even "retail" value) of the medical services 
provided. 
F. BUYERS ARE UTILITY MAXIMIZERS 
Economists assume that consumers, including healthcare consumers, 
make their market choices by opting for the most preferable bundle of goods, 
                                                             
82 Brill, supra note 1, at 23; Arrow, supra note 36, at 949, 964–65. 
83 Brill, supra note 1, at 22. 
84 Supra at text between notes 30 and 31. 
85 Ryan Sugden, Sick and (Still) Broke: Why the Affordable Care Act 
Won't End Medical Bankruptcy, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 441, 468 (2012). 
86 Id. at 444 (noting that, in 2007, 62% of individual bankruptcies could 
be traced to a medical event). 
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given their resource constraints.87 Perhaps the shakiest part of the assumption 
is that healthcare consumers are capable of rationally maximizing their utility. 
Given the opaqueness of the market,88 healthcare consumers have ceded 
considerable control to their physicians and, for the more fortunate with 
insurance, to their insurance providers. Nevertheless, one can consider the 
unavoidably ignorant, and frequently anxious, patient as maximizing his 
utility by simply relying on the counsel of his physician, who may well share 
the patient's ignorance of the cost of medical goods going into the market 
basket.89 In the case of the uninsured, it is simply a matter of foregoing the 
"luxury" of a diagnosis, or the resulting prescriptions for, say, high blood 
pressure or incipient diabetes, to assure that the patient and her family 
remained fed, clothed and housed, To the onlooker, it appears a Hobson's 
choice; to the patient, it is utility maximization. For purposes of this analysis, 
however, the writers assume that the healthcare market meets the condition of 
utility maximization. 
G. NO EXTERNAL PARTIES REGULATE PRICE, QUANTITY OR 
QUALITY OF THE GOODS AND SERVICES EXCHANGED IN THE 
"MARKET" 
It would seem to go without saying that there exist a number of sources 
of external regulation in the healthcare markets. While free market advocates 
might want to look first at fixing this market "deficiency," the problem is 
neither simple nor easily resoluble. No one seriously disputes that the 
development of drugs (prescription and non-prescription) and medical 
devices is highly regulated. Reducing that regulation might produce greater 
efficiencies in getting drugs and devices to market. However, the benefits of 
such a policy would need to be weighed against the prospect of more tainted 
                                                             
87 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 57, at 87. 
88 See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
89 Belk, supra note 32, at 4. 
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drugs, drug frauds, and quack remedies.90 Given the complexity of the 
products available, it is hard to fathom how the market (made up either of 
attending physicians or their patients) could begin to evaluate the claims of 
competing manufacturers. Dissecting that problem (or promise?) goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, regulation, actual and potential, does not 
end there. 
Currently, the market "regulates" physician malpractice with individual 
and class actions. A patient's claim is tested in a court of law, usually by a 
jury. Plaintiffs' personal injury attorneys, compensated by contingent fees, 
represent the most market-driven portion of the bar. Because every case 
represents a major investment of time and money, attorneys have to prudently 
assess which cases have merit and which are black holes. Imprudent 
assessments make for hungry attorneys. Nevertheless, the process is 
cumbersome, idiosyncratic, costly, and time-consuming. For all these 
reasons, there is a growing movement for malpractice reform. One proposal is 
to provide a "safe-harbor" defense to physicians. Physicians and hospitals 
could invoke the defense by showing that the symptoms presented did not 
call for the unreasonable expense avoided.91 The test for "reasonableness" 
would be established by peers within the medical community; not by experts 
in the courtroom.92 The proposal could reduce incentives to overuse 
expensive testing and diagnostic procedures merely to avoid later claims that 
a case would not have had the unfortunate result that gave rise to the suit.93 
Of course, the proposed reform does not address the other incentive to 
overuse diagnostic protocols; namely, that they are such an easy and lucrative 
way to increase revenues for hospitals and for private practices.94  
                                                             
90 ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: 
COMPLEXITY, CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 114–24 (1st ed. 2007). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Brill, supra note 1, at 55. 
94 Id. 
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There is, however, another form of external regulation designed 
expressly to keep healthcare costs high. While Medicare and Medicaid have 
been enormously successful in keeping their per-patient payout to a 
(comparative) minimum,95 with regard to healthcare services96 the same 
cannot be said for the purchase of prescription drugs. The two government 
programs are prevented by law from restraining prices for drugs, as is 
commonly done in other countries.97 Indeed, the two programs are even 
prohibited from using their considerable buying power (Medicare is the 
single largest buyer98) to negotiate lower drug prices. Instead, Medicare is 
required to pay 106% of the average sales price for prescription drugs.99 The 
catch is that the pharmaceutical companies set the price.100 This is especially 
problematic when patents guarantee a monopoly-pricing opportunity. If the 
patient only has a copay of five (5) to thirty (30) dollars, the patient will 
rarely complain. If the insurance company overpays on a new drug, it can 
recover with higher premiums the following year. 
Quite possibly, the most expensive example of protective legislation 
comes from Congress' barring Medicare from getting into the comparative 
effectiveness debate. If exhaustive comparative studies show that one drug, 
which costs dramatically less than a second drug, actually has the same or 
better results, Medicare should be able to say it will only cover the less 
expensive drug, forcing an efficiency that does not compromise care.101 
                                                             
95 Estimates of cost structures suggest that even Medic are and Medicaid 
could tighten up their compensation for services, without throwing the 
medical profession to the wolves. Brill, supra note 1, at 55. 
96 E.g., id. at 46–49. 
97 Id. at 46. 
98 Id. 
99 42 C.F.R. § 414.904 (the lesser of the actual charge or 106% of 
average sales price). 
100 Brill, supra note 1, at 43. 
101 Id. at 46. 
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However, that option is precluded by the Medicare requirement to reimburse 
patients at 106% of average sales price for any FDA-approved Part B drug.102 
Part of the so-called "death panel" debate had to do with efforts by ACA 
proponents to incorporate "comparative effectiveness" principles into the 
legislation, which would give Medicare more leverage to control costs.103 The 
principles were not incorporated. Brill observes that private hospitals, such as 
Sloan-Kettering, have successfully induced at least one pharmaceutical to 
reduce by half its colorectal-cancer drug originally priced at $11,063/month. 
It did so by pointing out that a competitive drug cost only $5,000 and was just 
as effective.104 By congressional fiat, Medicare is forbidden to similarly 
exploit its considerably greater market power.105 
H. SUMMARY: TO THE EXTENT HEALTHCARE IS EVEN A 
MARKET, IT IS NEITHER FREE NOR COMPETITIVE 
In summary, with or without the ACA, the healthcare market is a sellers' 
market; indeed, it is a sellers' captive market. There are numerous (desperate 
and ignorant) buyers and relatively few sellers. From the day each patient is 
born, the only way to exit the market is by death; that is an unmistakable 
barrier to exit. Necessarily, buyers have little real knowledge about the 
market and many sellers cynically exploit that vulnerability,106 while other 
sellers enjoy only a limited superiority to their patient-buyers' ignorance of 
market conditions.107 While there are elements of fungibility in the market,108 
much of the central physician-patient relationship is highly personal and 
                                                             
102 42 C.F.R. § 414.904; Brill, supra note 1, at 43 & 46. 
103 Brill, supra note 1, at 46. 
104 Id. 
105 42 C.F.R. § 414.904; Brill, supra note 1, at 43. 
106 Brill, supra note 1, passim; Pear, supra note 75; Arrow, supra note 
36, at 946. 
107 Belk, supra note 32, at 4. 
108 Supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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idiosyncratic.109 Multiple externalities make cost-control almost 
meaningless.110 Insured patients (that is, "fully insured") can afford the luxury 
of not attending to cost. Insurance companies can recover in the following 
year and providers can ratchet up price on the uninsured to cover lost profits 
resulting from having to bargain with the "market's" stronger players. While 
one can attempt to argue that patients are utility-maximizers, they remain so 
stressed and unavoidably ignorant that the necessary qualifier "rational" is 
oxymoronic. Given enormous constraints of knowledge, access, and 
resources, patients make the best of what they can with their limited options. 
Acknowledging those constraints compromises any characterization of 
patients as utility maximizers. 
Finally, this market has been and will remain heavily regulated.111 
Protecting the life and health of the public is both an individual and corporate 
concern.112 Primarily, healthcare regulation has focused on quality assurance, 
expanding access, and cost control.113 It is hard to imagine policy makers 
eschewing any one of those three goals. Obviously, the expected expansion of 
access to the healthcare system presents challenges to other two goals of 
quality assurance and cost control. Given that healthcare will continue to 
have an outsized presence114 in the American economy, both economic and 
policy reasons make significant deregulation unlikely.  
Because it involves the exchange of goods and services, the healthcare 
system can be called a "market." By almost every indicia (making some 
allowance for the fungibility and utility maximization conditions), however, it 
is not, and has not been for decades, a competitive market. It is much more 
                                                             
109 Arrow, supra note 36, at 949–51, 964–66. 
110 Supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
111 Supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
112 FIELD, supra note 91, at 3–4. 
113 Id. at 4. 
114 E.g., id. at 235–49. 
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like a casino, in which only the patient does not get to see the cards being 
played. This is especially true when one considers the plight of the uninsured 
patient. As healthcare expenditures approach a quarter of our GDP, getting a 
handle on cost is critical for society at large.115 For the uninsured, the 
situation is more dire. For many, it represents a choice between death and 
bankruptcy. 
IV. RESPONDING TO THE PLIGHT OF THE UNINSURED PROVIDES A 
LABORATORY FOR TESTING THE BROADER CHALLENGES OF 
REGULATING THIS MARKET 
The economic conditions surrounding healthcare call for some major 
intervention. As long as conditions remain as described herein, the United 
States will continue to see healthcare costs soar, without a parallel 
improvement in quality of the results. One remedy, to universalize Medicare 
coverage, was hinted at during the ACA debates.116 At the time, it was 
politically untenable and probably remains so.117 Given almost catastrophic 
market failure, the problem calls out for a legislative solution. While our 
current Congress may simply blink in the face of this public policy challenge, 
it could try a "small-bore" response to a much graver individual problem. 
The one truly vulnerable "player" in the market is the uninsured patient. 
With virtually no institutional forces to provide cover, the patient is a ready 
mark for profit and "non-profit"118 healthcare providers, especially if 
                                                             
115 E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 4. 
116 Sam Stein, Lieberman's Medicare Flip-Flop Leaves Democrats 
Fuming, THE HUFFINGTON POST (last updated May 25, 2011, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/14/liebermans-medicare-
flip_n_391732.html (chronicling Sen. Joseph's Lieberman's recantation of his 
healthcare proposal to expand Medicare coverage to those as young as 55). 
117 See Sudgen, supra note 85, at 443. 
118 Brill, supra note 1, at 24–28 (on the structure and success of so-
called "non-profit" hospitals). 
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unplanned emergency119 requires hospitalization. Having no market power, 
he/she can only hope for service provider largess. That largess, however, 
appears to becoming ever more scarce.120 Indeed, only the uninsured face the 
surrealism of the chargemaster, unaware that the hospital expects them to 
simply negotiate some small discount.121 For Sean and Stephanie Rechi, 
Janice, and Scott S.,122 negotiation is a chimera. Indeed, the ruthlessness of 
medical provider billing practices only confirms the experience of these 
patients.123 The "almost poor" uninsured represent the sweet spot in provider 
practice—the one population that the provider can charge the full 
chargemaster price. Even if the provider cannot ultimately wring every last 
charge out of the patient, it knows it got as much as it could and passes the 
remaining "loss" on to the taxpayer.124 
There is something cynically exploitative about these bill collection 
practices. Providers have singled out the one slice of the population that lacks 
any large institutional protection; namely, the working poor.125 Providers do 
                                                             
119 Rare (births excepted) would be the hospitalization that was planned. 
120 Sugden, supra note 85, at notes 44–48 and related text. 
121 Brill, supra note 1, at 22–24, 36. 
122 Id. at 1–6, 16–18 and accompanying text. 
123 See KAY STANLEY, COKER GROUP, MAXIMIZING BILLING AND 
COLLECTIONS IN THE MEDICAL PRACTICE 42–43 (2007); see also Sugden, 
supra note 85, at 447–48. 
124 To the extent the for-profit provider cannot recover from the 
impecunious patient, it seeks a tax deduction for the uncollected 
chargemaster-priced debt. 
125 Remember, those who are the most desperately poor are protected by 
Medicare and Medicaid. We are talking here of those who employment does 
not provide healthcare insurance at all. Even after full implementation of 
ACA, it is expected that this population will diminish; but not disappear. 
Sugden, supra note 85, at 443. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 29 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) Ɣ DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.76 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Mastering the 
Chargemaster  
Winter 2014 
not do it solely to recover their costs and a reasonable profit.126 They are not 
floundering institutions desperately trying to survive. Indeed, the most 
aggressive appear to be enormously profitable institutions.127 To make up for 
the chargemaster discounts afforded private insurance companies and the 
deeper discounts afforded federal insurance companies, they squeeze the so-
called "working poor." They continue to do it simply because they can. It is 
the naked exercise of market power against the most vulnerable in our 
society. Cursed with bad genes, bad health decisions, bad employment 
situations, bad luck, or a combination of all four factors, the victims are left 
with two choices—forego medical attention or risk personal bankruptcy. 
While this dysfunction may be tolerable (or even desirable) to Ron Paul 
supporters,128 it cannot be justified in any religious or ethical system currently 
accepted. Even if one could isolate those victims whose medical requirements 
were the consequence solely of bad health decisions, protecting the "market" 
against this seeming "moral hazard" would appear callous, at best. 
Nevertheless, it is not the focus of this paper to discuss the ethics of 
healthcare coverage. Its primary focus has been how to control the 
increasingly high cost of the product. If controlling quantity can only trim 
costs at the margins,129 an effort all the more belated when so many millions 
of new patients are to now be covered under the ACA, it is time to look at 
controlling price, the second element of "cost." "Controlling price" requires 
both a determination of pricing standards and a mechanism for applying the 
standards. It appears that the Medicare standards offer a readily available 
pricing standard. It has been tested for years and appears to assure that 
                                                             
126 Brill, supra note 1, at 22. 
127 Id. at 26, 50–51. 
128 Should society let the uninsured die?, supra note 53, and 
accompanying text. 
129 See, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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providers are sufficiently well-compensated that they do not routinely turn 
away Medicare patients.130 
Some may argue that the idea of price controls has no place in our free 
market system. As detailed above, that argument fails to address the market 
failures in our current system of healthcare,131 especially for the "less poor" 
uninsured. A related argument is that this limited proposal raises the specter 
of "moral hazard." What incentive will such individuals have to purchase 
insurance, even the subsidized insurance available under the ACA? However, 
the fear of moral hazard is misplaced. This particular group of patients is not 
getting an incredibly attractive deal that would make paying premiums a "bad 
deal." Under our proposal, they would be paying far more than their insured 
counterparts for a medical procedure. Paying the Medicare price for just 
about any procedure would reduce the patient's financial obligation by eighty 
(80) to ninety (90) percent,132 while assuring a reasonable compensation to 
the provider.133 That might still raise the specter of bankruptcy for the patient; 
but, the chance is reduced by that eighty (80) to ninety (90) percent. Further, 
as noted above,134 these patients do not find themselves in desperate straits 
because of their profligacy, nor for their lack of planning. Most of us do not 
have the wherewithal to save for the calamity of sudden accident or illness. 
For most of us, smokers perhaps excepted, a cancer diagnosis is not the result 
of poor planning or bad decisions. In the vast majority of cases, going 
uninsured is the result of not being fortunate enough to find employment that 
provides adequate (or any) insurance. To the extent the diagnosis is the result 
of bad decisions, insurance insulates us from the worst consequences of our 
all too human follies. Asking someone to place in jeopardy all their assets in 
                                                             
130 Brill, supra note 1, at 43. 
131 See, passim, Section III. 
132 Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 4–5 (a colonoscopy costing $4,158 in 
Seattle would bear a Medicare price of $531) 
133 Brill, supra note 1, at 43. 
134 See, passim, Section I. 
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the face of an adverse medical diagnosis is to worry way too much about 
"moral hazard" in the face of genuine human tragedy. 
Maryland has actually taken this idea much farther than we have 
proposed here. Since 1971, its independent Health Services Cost Review 
Commission (HSCRC ) has regulated rates that its state hospitals could 
receive from anyone paying for a patient's medical care (Medicare, Medicaid, 
private insurer, or individual).135 With numerous safeguards to assure 
regulatory independence, the HSCRC has successfully controlled the hospital 
care cost spiral, while the rest of the country has only talked about it.136 
Moreover, the system also successfully expanded access to hospital care.137 
One observer has proposed expanding the system to include setting 
physicians' rates.138 The point here, however, is only to note that a proposal 
similar to the one presented here has been successfully implemented for over 
40 years. Indeed, at both the state and federal level, It is unnecessary to 
recreate the Maryland mechanism. The administrative machinery is already in 
place. Medicare and Medicaid have developed enormous databases that make 
them singularly appropriate to implement the proposal.139 
If this country has reached a level of development such that healthcare is 
deemed as essential as water, then we need to think more smartly about how 
we deliver that care. There was a time when it was not a necessity, simply 
                                                             
135 John A. Dastor & Eli Y. Adashi, Maryland's Hospital Cost Review 
Commission at 40: A Model for the Country, 306 JAMA 1137, 1137 
(Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com.proxy.seattleu 
.edu/article.aspx?articleid=1104315. 
136 Id. at 1138. 
137 Id. 
138 Barry F. Rosen, What if the HSCRC Set Doctors' Rates?, MID-
ATLANTIC HEALTH LAW TOPICS (2009), http://www.gfrlaw.com/pubs/ 
GordonPubDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=745 (last visited Apr. 20, 
2014 5:22 PM). 
139 E.g., Brill, supra note 1, at 47–48. 
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because it could offer so little relief.140 Those days are clearly gone. With 
great opportunity, however, comes great cost. Getting control of that cost is 
one of the major public policy issues of the next decade(s). If Medicare 
provides the price-setting standards, it also can provide the mechanisms. 
Amending Medicare would provide the statutory and related administrative 
framework for such a limited test as proposed here. One might also invoke 
the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), charged under the ACA 
with bending the cost curve of healthcare expenses, as a possible mechanism 
for this task. Obviously, whichever statutory framework was employed, there 
would be a huge political battle over both the extension of "coverage" to the 
uninsured and the invocation of price controls. If past is prologue, however, 
there would be no significant discussion of alternatives to the proposal. 
                                                             
140 Consider the difference between the healthcare George Washington 
could enjoy and that of his slaves. Given a cancer diagnosis, possible only in 
the later stages of its development, about the only difference between the 
treatments available to master and slave would be the quality of the alcohol 
used to numb the pain. Washington's only other "advantage" might be the 
more frequent bloodlettings that would unintentionally hasten his end. 
